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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.										
09/685,716	10/11/2000	Andrew R. Cleasby	CIS00-2909	5970										
7590 Barry W. Chapin, Esq. CHAPIN & HUANG, L.L.C. Westborough Office Park 1700 West Park Drive Westborough, MA 01581		<table border="1"><tr><td>EXAMINER</td></tr><tr><td>RUTLEDGE, AMELIA L</td></tr><tr><td>ART UNIT</td><td>PAPER NUMBER</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">2176</td></tr><tr><td>MAIL DATE</td><td>DELIVERY MODE</td></tr><tr><td>04/17/2007</td><td>PAPER</td></tr></table>			EXAMINER	RUTLEDGE, AMELIA L	ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER	2176		MAIL DATE	DELIVERY MODE	04/17/2007	PAPER
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Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

**Advisory Action
Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief**

Application No. 09/685,716	Applicant(s) CLEASBY ET AL.
Examiner Amelia Rutledge	Art Unit 2176

--The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

THE REPLY FILED 23 March 2007 FAILS TO PLACE THIS APPLICATION IN CONDITION FOR ALLOWANCE.

1. The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or on the same day as filing a Notice of Appeal. To avoid abandonment of this application, applicant must timely file one of the following replies: (1) an amendment, affidavit, or other evidence, which places the application in condition for allowance; (2) a Notice of Appeal (with appeal fee) in compliance with 37 CFR 41.31; or (3) a Request for Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance with 37 CFR 1.114. The reply must be filed within one of the following time periods:

a) The period for reply expires _____ months from the mailing date of the final rejection.
 b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this Advisory Action, or (2) the date set forth in the final rejection, whichever is later. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of the final rejection.

Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (b). ONLY CHECK BOX (b) WHEN THE FIRST REPLY WAS FILED WITHIN TWO MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(f).

Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date on which the petition under 37 CFR 1.136(a) and the appropriate extension fee have been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extension and the corresponding amount of the fee. The appropriate extension fee under 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the shortened statutory period for reply originally set in the final Office action; or (2) as set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of the final rejection, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

NOTICE OF APPEAL

2. The Notice of Appeal was filed on _____. A brief in compliance with 37 CFR 41.37 must be filed within two months of the date of filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any extension thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to avoid dismissal of the appeal. Since a Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed within the time period set forth in 37 CFR 41.37(a).

AMENDMENTS

3. The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, but prior to the date of filing a brief, will not be entered because
 (a) They raise new issues that would require further consideration and/or search (see NOTE below);
 (b) They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE below);
 (c) They are not deemed to place the application in better form for appeal by materially reducing or simplifying the issues for appeal; and/or
 (d) They present additional claims without canceling a corresponding number of finally rejected claims.

NOTE: _____. (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)).

4. The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.121. See attached Notice of Non-Compliant Amendment (PTOL-324).
 5. Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s): _____.
 6. Newly proposed or amended claim(s) _____ would be allowable if submitted in a separate, timely filed amendment canceling the non-allowable claim(s).

7. For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a) will not be entered, or b) will be entered and an explanation of how the new or amended claims would be rejected is provided below or appended.

The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows:

Claim(s) allowed: _____.

Claim(s) objected to: _____.

Claim(s) rejected: _____.

Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration: _____.

AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE

8. The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, but before or on the date of filing a Notice of Appeal will not be entered because applicant failed to provide a showing of good and sufficient reasons why the affidavit or other evidence is necessary and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e).
 9. The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing a Notice of Appeal, but prior to the date of filing a brief, will not be entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to overcome all rejections under appeal and/or appellant fails to provide a showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessary and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 41.33(d)(1).

10. The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanation of the status of the claims after entry is below or attached.

REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER

11. The request for reconsideration has been considered but does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because:
See Continuation Sheet.
 12. Note the attached Information Disclosure Statement(s). (PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s). _____
 13. Other: _____.


Doug Huston
 Primary Examiner
 Technology Center 2100

AR

Continuation of 11. does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because:

Applicant's arguments filed 03/23/2007 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.

Applicant argues that the combination of references does not teach the limitation of claim 1, "setting a document domain property of each document contained in the browser to a common value" (Remarks, p. 13-14). Montulli is relied upon to teach the limitation "setting a document domain property of each document contained in the browser to a common value." Montulli teaches setting the domain name on a cookie using a CGI script on a client (col. 7, l. 55-col. 8, l. 52; col. 10, l. 25-68).

Further, setting the domain property of a document was well known in the art at the time of the invention, since it was a method included in the JavaScript programming language, to address the problem of allowing scripts to share properties for large web sites that use multiple servers. The excerpt of the book JavaScript: The Definitive Guide, 3rd Ed., Flanagan, published June 1998, p. 1-5, especially p. 5, although not being relied upon for the rejection, provides evidence that setting the domain property of a document was well known in the art at the time of the invention.

While applicant argues that a domain property stored within a cookie does not qualify as a document domain property as recited by claim 1 (Remarks, p. 14, par. 1), the examiner respectfully disagrees. As set forth in the JavaScript reference, and as disclosed by Montulli in the example at col. 10, l. 25-68, and at col. 7, l. 55-col. 8, l. 52, the document domain property (also referred to as domain attribute), may be set to a default domain. Claim 1 recites setting a document domain property of each document contained in the browser to a common value, but does not specify or limit in the claim where the document domain property is set and/or stored, therefore the domain property of each document contained in the browser might be set in a cookie or cookies, as is clearly disclosed by Montulli at col. 7, l. 55-col. 8, l. 52; col. 10, l. 25-68.

In response to applicant's argument that a cookie list does not qualify as "each document in the browser" (Remarks, p. 14), the examiner respectfully disagrees. A cookie does allow a document domain property of each document in the browser to be set to a common value, since a cookie may contain properties for multiple documents in a browser.

Further, in response to applicant's arguments generally regarding interpretation of claim terms, the claims must be given the broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification.

MPEP 2106 cites: USPTO personnel are to give claims their broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the supporting disclosure. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054-55, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027-28 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Limitations appearing in the specification but not recited in the claim should not be read into the claim. E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1369, 67 USPQ2d 1947, 1950 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (claims must be interpreted "in view of the specification" without importing limitations from the specification into the claims unnecessarily). In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05, 162 USPQ 541, 550-551 (CCPA 1969). See also In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321-22, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("During patent examination the pending claims must be interpreted as broadly as their terms reasonably allow.... The reason is simply that during patent prosecution when claims can be amended, ambiguities should be recognized, scope and breadth of language explored, and clarification imposed.... An essential purpose of patent examination is to fashion claims that are precise, clear, correct, and unambiguous. Only in this way can uncertainties of claim scope be removed, as much as possible, during the administrative process.").